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Abstract Should we grant rights to artificially intelligent
robots? Most current and near-future robots do not meet the
hard criteria set by deontological and utilitarian theory.
Virtue ethics can avoid this problem with its indirect
approach. However, both direct and indirect arguments for
moral consideration rest on ontological features of entities,
an approach which incurs several problems. In response to
these difficulties, this paper taps into a different conceptual
resource in order to be able to grant some degree of moral
consideration to some intelligent social robots: it sketches a
novel argument for moral consideration based on social
relations. It is shown that to further develop this argument
we need to revise our existing ontological and social-
political frameworks. It is suggested that we need a social
ecology, which may be developed by engaging with
Western ecology and Eastern worldviews. Although this
relational turn raises many difficult issues and requires
more work, this paper provides a rough outline of an
alternative approach to moral consideration that can assist
us in shaping our relations to intelligent robots and, by
extension, to all artificial and biological entities that appear
to us as more than instruments for our human purposes.
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Introduction
Current robots are not only used in industrial contexts; they
find applications in many new domains, including the
personal and social sphere. We now have entertainment
robots, toy robots, nursing robots, sex robots, and educa-
tional robots, amongst others, and the prevalence of such
robots is expected to increase strongly over the next few
decades (Veruggio 2006). It is likely that in the near future
many of these robots will be artificially intelligent and have
the ability to interact with humans in a human-like way.
For instance, it is projected that we will live with ‘social
robots’ (Breazeal 2003) or ‘artificial companions’ that may
act as artificial pets, provide information services, take care
of home security, assist health care, or perform household
tasks (Floridi 2008; Dautenhahn et al. 2005). Moreover,
several artificially intelligent robots are used and being
developed for military use, many of which have humanoid
characteristics (see for instance DARPA humanoid robot
projects in the US).
These developments raise many ethical issues. Usually
these concern the implications of intelligent robots for
humans (Sharkey 2008). Robots are seen as (potential)
moral agents, which may harm humans and therefore need
a ‘morality’. It is argued that robots should follow laws that
prevent them from harming humans, as the famous ‘Laws
of Robotics’ testify (Asimov 1942), or that we should build
‘moral machines’ that do not only follow ‘top-down’ laws
given to them by humans but that also have the capacity to
develop into moral machines ‘bottom up’, that is, by moral
learning emerging from their intelligence (Wallach &
Allen 2008). However, sometimes robots come into focus
as ‘moral patients’. How should we treat them? Given that
some robots will become more human-like, should (some)
robots be protected from abuse by humans? For instance,
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Whitby has called for urgent action on the ethics of mis-
treatment of human-like artefacts (Whitby 2008). The
ethical question I ask here is more general: should we take
artificially intelligent robots into moral consideration at all?
Often this issue is framed in terms of rights. In 2000
Rodney Brooks, director of the Artificial Intelligence Lab
at M.I.T., wrote a Time article entitled ‘Will Robots Rise
Up and Demand Their Rights?’ in which he says that
robots will become more human-like, which ‘will eventu-
ally lead to robots to which we will want to extend the
same inalienable rights that humans enjoy’ (Brooks 2000).
Recently there is a proliferation of calls for robot rights. ‘A
report commissioned for the UK government, containing a
paper on ‘Robo-rights: Utopian Dream or Rise of the
Machines?’ (2006), suggested that robots may demand
rights in the future. Peter Asaro thinks along the same lines.
Identifying robots rights as one of the issues robot ethics
should be concerned with, he asks ‘How should robots treat
people, and how should people treat robots? Should robots
have rights?’ (Asaro 2006, p. 10). He speculates: ‘At some
point in the future, robots might simply demand their
rights.’ (Asaro 2006, p. 12). In a recent conference paper
David Levy has argued that artificially conscious robots
should have rights (Levy 2009). And Steve Torrance, after
noting that the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights
does not cater for the rights of artificial agents or human-
oids (Torrance 2008, p. 496), asks if there are ‘any cir-
cumstances under which it might be morally appropriate
for us to consider extending such rights specifically to
humanoids that are taken to be devoid of phenomenal
consciousness?’ (Torrance 2008, p. 501).
However, how adequate is this ‘rights’ approach for the
issue at hand? Robots with consciousness or the ability to
‘demand their rights’ seem to belong to the realm of sci-
ence-fiction or at least the far future. Does this mean that
current and near-future artificially intelligent robots should
be excluded from our moral world entirely? Are there
perhaps other ways of granting them moral consideration?
In this paper, I argue that the rights approach is not flawed
per se but that we should expand the range of arguments for
moral consideration of current and near-future artificially
intelligent robots in at least three ways. In the course of my
arguments I discuss analogies with the ‘animal rights’
discussion and emancipation claims.
First I will draw attention to the observation that moral
consideration comes in degrees, that giving ‘rights’ to an
entity is a particularly strong form of moral consideration,
and that there are other forms of moral consideration that
may be more appropriate and relevant to the kind of arti-
ficially intelligent robots we may use and live with in the
near future. Then I will note that apart from rights, a
concept which is directly related to deontology, there are
other theoretical frameworks which we might want to use
to argue for giving robots moral consideration: utilitarian-
ism and virtue ethics. However, I will show that all three
kinds of arguments (deontological, utilitarian, and virtue)
rely on ontological, non-relational features of the robot
(and the human) and that this approach incurs several
problems. In response to these problems, I explore alter-
native arguments for moral consideration. First I discuss
arguments that—like virtue ethics—are based on indirect
moral status (based on human personhood, human property
rights, and human values). However, they turn out to be
vulnerable to the previous objections and do not seem to be
very ‘moral’ given that their justification is exclusively
rooted in the subject of moral consideration. Then I offer a
novel argument that employs a social-relational justifica-
tion of moral consideration. This approach takes seriously
the moral-social significance of appearance and is based on
an ecological social ontology instead of a contractarian,
utilitarian, or communitarian one. I suggest that in order to
further develop such an ontology, we may want to take
inspiration from environmental ethics and Eastern or Asian
philosophy. I then discuss some implications of this
approach for moral consideration of robots, animals, and
humans.
Standard direct and indirect arguments
for moral consideration
Direct arguments for moral consideration
Giving rights to an entity is a particularly strong form of
moral consideration: it implies that the entity in question
has inherent worth and that therefore the entity needs to be
treated as such irrespective of all other (human or non-
human) considerations. It is connected to the deontological
and natural rights traditions in moral theory, which in turn
can be interpreted as secular continuations of the Jewish-
Christian idea that the person has an inherent worth as a
creature of God.1 Hence, rights are given a kind of quasi-
sacred status: any violation of them counts as a secular
version of sin. In the Kantian tradition, the spiritual nature
of man is replaced2 by the rational nature of persons.
According to Kant, anyone who violates rights does not
1 It is believed that humans are created in the image of God (the so-
called imago Dei doctrine, based on Genesis).
2 Perhaps ‘replaced’ is not exactly right: as said, there was also
continuation. There is an influential (Aristotelian) current of thought
in the Christian tradition that stresses the rational nature of the person.
Thomas Aquinas viewed the person in terms of rational nature. He did
not oppose rationality to spirituality. He followed Boethius, who in
his Liber de Persona et Duabus Naturis defined the person as an
individual substance of a rational nature. Boethius was a translator of
Aristotle, who held that man was a rational animal.
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take into consideration that, ‘as rational beings’, others
should at the same time be treated as ends (Kant 1785,
p. 92).3 In such Enlightenment arguments, direct references
to religion or spirituality are absent. However, in modern
deontological ethics the idea is retained that rights should
therefore be respected at (literally) all costs. For example,
human rights are seen as inalienable rights that always
should be respected and that ground other goods. The first
lines of the Preamble of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, adopted by the UN in 1948, holds that
‘recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and
inalienable rights of all members of the human family is
the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world’.
To make a claim for robot rights in the deontological tra-
dition, then, is to make a claim for strong moral consid-
eration. But there are many more possible forms of moral
consideration and other kinds of arguments. As Gruen
remarks: ‘Being morally considerable is like showing up
on a moral radar screen—how strong the signal is or where
it is located on the screen are separate questions’ (Gruen
2003).
In order to explore alternative forms of moral consid-
eration of robots and different justifications, let me make
an analogy to arguments for moral consideration of ani-
mals. Regan, from a deontological position, has argued that
some animals have rights since they are experiencing
‘subjects of a life’: they have wants, preferences, beliefs,
feelings, memories, and expectations, and their welfare
matters to them (Regan 1983). However, this is not the
only kind of position in the debate. Utilitarians adopt a
different approach. They reject deontological rights and if
they use the language of rights they understand them as
derived from utilitarian principles. For them, what counts is
not the protection of inalienable rights but the promotion of
happiness, pleasure or interests and the avoidance of suf-
fering or frustration of interests. Singer has argued that any
being—human or non-human—that is sentient and there-
fore has an interest in not suffering deserves to have that
interest taken into account (Singer 1975, 1993). This
implies that utilitarians can give moral consideration to
humans and non-humans alike, provided that they are
sentient. In practice, this means that the boundary of moral
consideration is wider than in the rights approach, since
there may be many animals that cannot be considered
subjects-of-a-life but that are sentient.
In spite of the many differences between these positions,
which I will not discuss here, there are many similarities as
well. Both arguments demand moral consistency: it is
argued that the human/non-human distinction is not mor-
ally relevant when it comes to treatment of animals. The
reasoning may go as follows. In human history, animals
have always been enslaved and mistreated because they
were (and are) considered to be non-human. However, why
should we restrict rights to humans? It is speciecist to do
so. ‘Speciecism’ is a term Singer ascribed to his opponents
and refers to the view that a certain species, here humans, is
superior to other species (Singer 1975). But why should the
species barrier be a moral barrier? Singer has argued that
we should take sentience (and therefore an interest in not
suffering) as a criterion, not being a member of a certain
species—be it the human species or another one. Similarly,
Regan has questioned the human/non-human distinction as
a moral distinction for ascribing rights (Regan 1983). Thus,
both Singer and Regan appeal to the demand for consis-
tency: they share the view that if we take a certain char-
acteristic to be grounds for ascribing rights in humans, we
should be consistent and do the same for non-humans that
have the same characteristic in common, e.g. sentience
(Singer) or being the subject of your life (Regan).
For robots, one can make a similar demand for consis-
tency coupled with an emancipatory claim that can also be
found in the animal rights movement broadly understood
(based on deontological and utilitarian arguments): if (in
the future) it turns out that robots share features with
humans such as rationality or consciousness, then if we
hold these features as a basis for human rights, why restrict
those rights to humans? If they might one day become
sentient, then why neglect their interests in avoidance of
suffering? Why continue to treat artificially intelligent
robots as things we can use or abuse if we have good
reasons to include them in our community of moral con-
sideration and rights? We have emancipated slaves,
women, and some animals. First slaves and women were
not treated as ‘men’. However, we made moral progress
and now we consider them as human. In the past animals
were treated as things, but we learned that many of them
can feel and think. Now, or in the near future, it is time to
give certain robots what is due to them on account of their
intelligence, consciousness, or whatever feature we humans
share with them we believe is a basis for ascribing rights or
for taking their interest into account.
In the ethics of robotics literature, the emancipatory
mission that motivates the call for robot rights is not always
present or made explicit; however, the analogy to animal
rights can always be drawn and is sometimes made expli-
cit. Calverley, for instance, has explored the analogy
between the debate on rights for androids and animal
rights. Discussing the similarities between animals and
androids, he has pointed to the issue of the relation between
our ideas of consciousness and our concept of rights
3 Unfolding his ‘Formulate of the End in Itself’ in the Groundwork,
Kant argued that in contrast to non-rational beings, who have only
‘relative value as means and are consequently called things’, rational
beings are persons ‘because their nature already marks them out as
ends in themselves—that is, as something which ought not to be used
merely as a means’ (Kant 1785, pp. 90–91).
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(Calverley 2006). And McNally and Inayatullah (1998)
have put the discussion about robot rights within a broader
historical and cultural framework. But regardless of the
particular perspective of the authors, the arguments always
draw on ontological features of the entity that are seen as
morally significant.
This reveals a deeper argumental similarity between the
rights and utilitarian position in the discussions about
robots and about animals. Both arguments for consistency
(and emancipation) rely on holding a particular ontological
feature of the entity in question to be sufficient for granting
moral consideration to that entity: rationality, conscious-
ness, sentience, and so on.
This approach is problematic for two kinds of reasons.
Apart from well-known problems of application (for
instance, what exactly counts as respecting an entity’s
rights or capacity for suffering?), deontological and utili-
tarian accounts face problems with regard to their justifi-
cation of moral consideration. Since their approach to
moral consideration is based on ontological features of the
entity, they incur at least the following problems.
High thresholds and relevance
Before outlining problems of justification, let me first
mention an important problem of application. Today robots
are neither conscious nor sentient. It is even questionable if
any of them really are (artificially) intelligent. This renders
arguments based upon such features irrelevant to the
problem of how to think about giving moral consideration
to currently existing intelligent robots. Similar problems
with ‘too high’ thresholds happen in environmental ethics:
a tree is neither conscious nor sentient, yet there might be
other reasons why we want to grant it some moral con-
sideration.4 One option is to lower the threshold, as Floridi
and Sanders did when they proposed the features of
interactivity, autonomy and adaptability (Floridi and
Sanders 2004). However, I doubt if this does enough justice
to the new social functions of these robots and how they
appear to us (I will return to this issue below). Moreover,
very young human infants are neither very interactive nor
highly autonomous, yet intuitively we wish to give a high
moral status to them. This limitation takes us to the next
issue.
Argument from marginal cases
Arguments based on ontology are often vulnerable to what
in animal ethics is known as the argument from marginal
cases5: if particular properties are agreed upon as being
sufficient for moral status and if not all humans share these
properties (all the time), does that imply that these humans
are not worthy of our moral concern (at the time)? Small
children or aged adults do not always meet the criteria. And
does our moral status disappear when we sleep? Deonto-
logical and utilitarian theories each try to deal with this
problem in different ways, but it is not always easy to
uphold the demand for consistency given their adherence to
the moral significance of ontological properties of an
entity.
Determination problems and moral epistemology
Provided that the previous difficulties can be overcome
(and they partly have been overcome), then there are the
following epistemological problems: it is difficult to agree
which ontological property is morally relevant and to
provide proof that the entity in question has that property.
Consider robots again. Why should we agree with Levy,
who proposes consciousness as a criterion? Why should we
agree with Floridi and Sanders, who propose different
criteria? Our moral intuitions differ on what criteria are the
relevant ones. Moreover, even if we could agree on that,
then can we provide ‘hard’ evidence for the presence of
these criteria in a particular robot, given that the criteria are
rather abstract? The debate on the moral status of animals
faces a similar difficulty: the two main influential figures in
that debate argue that moral status should be granted on the
basis of an animal being a ‘subject-of-a-life’ (Regan 1983)
or being sentient (Singer 1975). However, how do we know
that these are the relevant features? And, faced with a
particular entity, how can one provide proof of, say, ‘being
the subject-of-a-life’? What is the moral-epistemic basis
for making such claims? (And why is it permitted to go
from ‘is’ (ontology) to ‘ought’ (moral consideration) any-
way? I will return to this problem below.)
Individuals and society
The rights approach focuses on the individual rights and
the utilitarian approach on (the sum of) individual interests.
In doing so, they make assumptions about the relation
between individual entities and the wholes these entities
are part of (systems, societies, communities) and these
assumptions are problematic. By focussing on individual
4 For instance, according to deep ecology, trees have inherent value
as part of the ecosystem. Leopold would have considered them as
parts of what he called the ‘biotic community’ (Leopold 1949). But
one might also use an indirect argument for moral consideration: trees
should be granted moral consideration to the extent that they
contribute to human well-being. I will discuss indirect arguments
below.
5 For an overview of the discussion about the argument see for
example Dombrowski 1997.
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features they tend to neglect the moral relevance of rela-
tions between entities and of the wholes they are part of.
For instance, by reducing ethics of robots to the debate
about moral status of robots and humans (as based in their
ontology), it leaves out of sight how (changes in) relations
and social wholes at least contribute to (changes in) moral
consideration. I will return to this point below.
Indirect arguments for moral consideration
One may object now that I have unnecessarily limited my
discussion to deontological and utilitarian theory. Why not
consider virtue ethics? At first sight, virtue ethics seems to
avoid the problems mentioned above since it employs an
indirect argument for moral consideration: if we (humans)
wish to be virtuous persons, we should treat animals well.
Abusing them is wrong not because it is a violation of
rights or because on balance more suffering is created than
with another act, but because we, as members of a moral
community, do not exercise virtues such as compassion
when abusing them. For instance, Hacker-Wright (2007)
has argued that our answer to the question concerning
moral consideration of animals depends on our conception
of the demands of the virtue of justice.
By shifting the focus from the object of moral consid-
eration to the subject of moral consideration, virtue ethics
seems to avoid the problems mentioned above. The
threshold is set by the virtues, there are no marginal cases
within the (human) moral community where everyone is
equal, we no longer need to know particular features of the
entity and their relation to moral consideration, and surely
the importance of ‘community’ is accounted for. However,
this impression is false given the problem of application
this theory faces. Not only is it unclear how we can know
what the virtues are (which is a problem of justification);
from the general principle, it is not clear at all (1) in
relation to what entities we should exercise our (human)
virtues and (2) what the application of that virtue consists
in. Deontological and utilitarian approaches to moral con-
sideration share these problems, except that they provide
(ontological) criteria to respond to the first problem (which
entities) whereas virtue ethics does not. Therefore, it
remains unclear how it can avoid ontological justification
and its problems. Moreover, it is very likely that, when
pressed for it, virtue ethicists will provide that type of
justification since their ethics is based on the moral status
of humans and to defend that side of the argument they
assume a similar ontological foundation of its human-
centred ethics. In its neo-Aristotelian version, virtue ethics
roots its ethics in a particular view of human nature: man is
a rational animal and a ‘political animal’, that is, a being
which only develops itself, and can only flourish, as part of
a moral and social community. For example, Hursthouse’s
( 1999, p. 68) answer to the problem of justification is that
virtue is ‘a character trait that a human being, given her
(human) nature, biological and psychological, needs (…) to
flourish or live well’.6 MacIntyre (1999) defines human
nature in terms of (social) dependence: we can only
flourish through developing social relationships and com-
munities. Such neo-Aristotelian views are far more rela-
tional than the social philosophies that are home to rights
and utilitarianism, but in so far as they remain Aristotelian
they by definition restrict themselves to humans. Humans,
for Aristotle the only rational and political beings, are the
top of the pyramid of beings. Thus, in order to provide a
foundation for its claims about moral consideration, a
virtue ethicist will have to provide an ontology and will
provide one which seems to exclude all non-humans from
moral consideration. The only way to avoid this, it seems,
is to put forward ontological criteria that are ‘lower’ and
allow us to include some animals, robots, and other enti-
ties. But this solution leaves the theoretical boundaries of
neo-Aristotelianism and (still) incurs the problems men-
tioned above—problems related to the reliance on onto-
logical features.
One may object, however, that although there are prob-
lems with virtue ethics’ indirect argument, virtue ethics
could say that it has a straightforward consequentialist rea-
son why this focus on the human is acceptable: if all humans
were to exercise their virtue of compassion (a virtue justified
by reference to humans), then as a consequence certain
animals would fare better than they do now. This argument
could be applied to highly intelligent robots as well. I con-
cede this; nevertheless I wonder how broad and systematic
protection of non-humans would be. For me to develop
myself into a morally high-standing being that lives the
flourishing life, the best life there is for beings like us, it
might be enough that I develop and exercise my compassion
in relation to one animal or one robot, for example my pet
animal or pet robot. If everyone does that, many animals will
be treated well as a consequence. However, something seems
to be missing here that renders it less ‘moral’: it goes against
the intuition that the motivation for and justification of moral
consideration should not have its source in our own well-
being or our own moral status alone (the subject or giver of
moral consideration) but at least also in the well-being or
status of the object or receiver of moral consideration—an
intuition shared with deontological and utilitarian theories of
moral consideration.
Other indirect arguments for moral consideration face
the same limitations. For instance, one can base moral
consideration of animals and robots on the property rights
of humans, or, more broadly, on the value we humans give
6 Hursthouse then goes onto develop a Humean interpretation, which
I shall not discuss here.
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to things. Indeed, we already give some moral consider-
ation to many objects, including robots, not because we
believe that they have rights or that they are sentient but
because we own them or because we value them in other
ways. For instance, one may protect a tree in one’s garden
because one loves the view, because it contributes to the
aesthetic value of the garden. Or we may protect very
intelligent robots because we value them as objects to
perform experiments with. The range of human values is
wide and many non-humans benefit from the related
practices of moral consideration. However, these argu-
ments face similar problems as the approaches discussed
above. First, in order to determine the value of a non-
human it seems that we have to know its ontological status.
Second, it remains doubtful how ‘moral’ this moral con-
sideration is given that its justificatory source is entirely
non-relational and non-social: it resides in the subject of
moral consideration. Is there an alternative way of thinking
about the issue of moral consideration?
An alternative, social-relational argument
for moral consideration
Towards a social-relational approach: appearance
and social relations
So far I discussed two sorts of arguments for moral con-
sideration. Direct arguments focus on the moral status of
the object, whereas indirect arguments centre on the moral
status of the subject. Both accounts of moral status are
based on the ontological features of the entity, an approach
which invites epistemological scepticism and incurs other
problems. The alternative approach I propose attempts to
avoid the scepticism by replacing the requirement that we
have certain knowledge about real ontological features of
the entity by the requirement that we experience the fea-
tures of the entity as they appear to us in the context of the
concrete human-robot relation and the wider social struc-
tures in which that relation is embedded. This requires
further explanation.
First, moral consideration is no longer seen as being
‘intrinsic’ to the entity: instead it is seen as something that
is ‘extrinsic’: it is attributed to entities within social rela-
tions and within a social context.
Second, this does not imply that features of the entity are
morally insignificant. We will continue to use them as
criteria on which we base our moral consideration. How-
ever, in this approach they are given a different status: they
are apparent features,7 features-as-experienced-by-us.
Third, this experience is not context-independent and
not subject-independent. It is context-dependent: in line
with feminist objections to standard moral theories,8 this
approach acknowledges the limitations of argumentation
that aims at general and abstract moral principles alone.
Instead, it asks more attention for the ways in which moral
consideration is granted to entities in various concrete
social relations and social contexts. Moreover, the experi-
ence is subject-dependent: in its response to the episte-
mological problem the approach learns from the
phenomenological tradition in philosophy, which has pro-
posed an interesting answer to the (false) dilemma between
idealism and realism. As far as I understand the basic
message of Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, and others, they
hold that consciousness is always directed towards objects
(for which phenomenologists use the technical term
‘intentionality’9) and that we can only have knowledge of
objects as they appear to us. Applied to moral consider-
ation, it means that moral significance resides neither in the
object nor in the subject, but in the relation between the
two. Objects such as robots do not exist in the human mind
alone (this would amount to idealism); however, it is also
true that we can only have knowledge of the object and its
features as they appear in our consciousness. There is no
direct, unmediated access to the robot as an objective,
observer-independent reality or ‘thing-in-itself’.10
The next step I then propose is to see this subject-object
relation as being shaped in social relations. What happens
between subject and object takes on a form in the concrete
social context, which is ‘prior’ to the moral argumentation
offered by traditional theories. Deontological and utilitar-
ian reasoning cannot be divorced from the social–historical
context in which these theories emerged: modern society
with its emphasis on the value of individuals and their
preferences. This does not mean that these theories get it
wrong or that we have no choice but to accept whatever
theory is prevalent in a social context. Instead, recognising
this link between theory and practice opens up an addi-
tional repertoire of moral vocabulary that helps us to dis-
tance ourselves from our usual ways of thinking and doing.
In this case, it helps us to better understand the issue of
moral consideration of robots by making comparisons with
how we treat other non-human entities at different times
7 See also Coeckelbergh 2009a, b, 2010.
8 Consider Gilligan 1982, Noddings 1984, Ruddick 1989, and Kittay
1999. By ‘standard moral theories’ these writers usually mean
deontology and utilitarianism.
9 For example, Sartre (1943, p. xxxvii) interprets intentionality in
terms of consciousness of an object. In Sartre’s words: ‘Conscious-
ness is consciousness of something’, it must ‘produce itself as a
revealed-revelation of a being that is not it’ (p. xxxviii).
10 Kant argued that we cannot know the thing-in-itself. The
phenomenological tradition and its concept of intentionality must be
understood as a response to Kant, i.e. a further development of Kant.
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and different contexts. In contrast to what the term ‘moral
status’ suggests, moral consideration must be seen as
subject to change. There are also differences within soci-
eties and between societies and cultures. Of course we can
and must critically evaluate these differences and changes.
However, if we do not go beyond the three traditional
theories summarized above, then we do not pay sufficient
attention to differences and changes since we occupy
ourselves with general criteria alone.
On a sub-societal level the approach focuses on moral
considerations in human-robot relations rather than on the
moral status of humans and robots alone. The implication
is that both the human and the robot are not so much
considered as atomistic individuals or members of a ‘spe-
cies’, but as relational entities whose identity depends on
their relations with other entities. The idea is that if we live
with artificially intelligent robots, we do not remain the
same individuals and the same humans as we were before.
Thus, the relational theory of moral consideration proposed
here must be connected with a relational theory of identity
and, in the end, a relational (social) ontology. Let me
explain this in the next sub-section.
The relation between individuals and society: social
ecology beyond contractarianism, utilitarianism
and communitarianism
The alternative approach proposed above may bracket
individual ontology by turning to appearance, it still needs
a social ontology given its focus on social relations and
their social context. A fully developed account would
require much more work; however, let me make the fol-
lowing suggestions about where I would like to position
my approach in relation to some influential social
philosophies.
In social philosophy, the rights approach is connected
with a contractarian social ontology. Individuals are prior to
the social, which comes only into being by agreement.11
Utilitarianism has a similar instrumentalist view of society:
what counts is the happiness, pleasure, preferences, and
interests of the individual. Society must safeguard and
increase the total amount of happiness, pleasure, or other
goods. For utilitarians, it is the total amount of happiness that
counts, not the good of society. It is, like the contractarian
society, a community of (individual) interests.12 Even
Marxism, which is usually seen as a form of collectivism,
contains an individualist strand to the extent that it views
society in an instrumental way. Marxists argue for collective
ownership of the means of production. However, the end-
goal remains formulated at an individual level: the unalien-
ated, happy and free individual13 that remains at the heart of
our imagination in modern times from Romanticism to
contemporary consumerism. In this sense, real collectivism
has never existed in the West. Even the totalitarianisms of the
twentieth century (e.g. Nazism, Fascism, Stalinism, Mao-
ism), which promoted the subordination of individuals to the
state, did not embrace a radical collectivism given their
leadership cults (a phenomenon that is not exclusive to
totalitarianism; it can also be seen in current democratic
societies). Thus, for a real contrast we must look elsewhere,
beyond Western modern liberal society.
Communitarians (and virtue ethicists) have a substan-
tially different view of the relation between individuals and
society: opposing liberal individualism, they ascribe value
to the community itself and see individuals as members of
the community, as being shaped by that community.
Authors such as MacIntyre (1984) and Taylor (1989)
appear to hold a relational ontology: the point of being
virtuous is the building of a moral community and there is
no fundamental difference between fostering individual
morality and fostering the morality of the community. In
this way, both the member of the community and the
community itself are not mere means to an end but ends in
themselves. Thus, communitarians are neither individualist
nor collectivist.14 However, communitarianism typically
11 Searle’s (1995, 2006) social ontology can be interpreted as
belonging to this tradition. An alternative approach would be to
understand the social as prior, giving shape to individuals and
individual lives—perhaps even to what we call ‘reality’ (consider
phenomenological and social constructionist approaches). I will refer
to social constructionism below but I will not further discuss the
differences between Searle and social constructionism here.
12 An alternative interpretation of utilitarianism would argue that
increasing the total amount of happiness cannot be done without help
from others and that the cultivation of mind and other ‘higher’
pleasures require or even presuppose others and society. But a
‘societal’ interpretation is not encouraged by utilitarianism’s
founders. For instance, Mill insists in Chapter 2 of Utilitarianism
that ‘it is a misapprehension of the utilitarian mode of thought, to
conceive of it as implying that people should fix their minds upon so
wide a generality as the world, or society at large. The great majority
of good actions are intended, not for the benefit of the world, but for
that of individuals, of which the good of the world is made up’ (Mill
1867, p. 27).
13 As Marx (1844) puts it in his Comments on James Mill, the goal of
‘production as human beings’ is to objectify my individuality, that is,
to enjoy the ‘individual manifestation of my life’ and to have the
pleasure of ‘knowing my personality to be objective’. And as Nordahl
(1987, p. 780) argues, in Marx’s view of the communist society, the
individual is not absorbed into the whole but instead human beings
structure their social relations in order to ‘to maximize their
enjoyment as creators’.
14 One may well question if contemporary communitarians really
hold this view or rather subscribe to modern Romantic individualism
with a communitarian flavour. I believe this is the case if they focus
on ‘the good life’ and virtue of the individual without really ascribing
to the communal relationalism described here.
Should we grant rights to robots? 215
123
restricts the boundaries of the moral and social community
to the human world. While there have been efforts to
connect ‘community’ and ‘ecology’ by authors with eco-
logical concerns15 and while as said above virtue ethics can
employ indirect arguments for moral consideration of non-
humans, following its Aristotelian roots ‘classic’ commu-
nitarianism and virtue ethics are directed at the moral
quality of humans and their human communities.
A similar anthropocentric limitation can be found in
most social constructionist theories. They move beyond
individualist and contractualist theories by understanding
individuals as dependent on social interactions and, more
generally, on a social order or context that transcends them
(see for instance Berger and Luckmann 1966). However,
the individuals and the social context in which they shape
themselves remain within the boundaries of the human.
(An interesting exception is Latour’s work: it attempts to
cross the nature/society distinction, the human/non-human
distinction, and other conceptual distinctions Latour (1993,
2004, 2005) attributes to modern thinking by introducing
the notion of the collective as a hybrid assembly of humans
and non-humans. However, I will not further discuss his
work here.)
Other candidates for relationalism may be found in non-
modern, non-Western cultures (keeping in mind that ‘pure’
forms of these cultures do not exist, if only because today
most of the countries where we would locate them, for
instance in Africa or Asia, the societies are soaked with
Western, modern values). For instance, it appears that
traditionally Chinese and Japanese cultures involve rela-
tional ontologies: humans are not ‘individuals’ but are
related to other humans and other entities.16
However, perhaps one of the most relational views
available to us can be found in current Western societies:
ecology. I mean not only ‘deep ecology’, the normative
view that challenges anthropocentric approaches, but also
ecology defined as a branch of natural science, which
studies relations between organisms and relations between
organisms and their environment. Both kinds of ecology
have usually little to say on the social. Usually they come
in the form of a natural ecology which is not, by itself, a
social ontology. However, natural ecology can be used as a
model to construct a social ontology that includes some
artificial entities (which is my interest here) and perhaps a
universal ontology (which seems to be Floridi’s aim when
he uses ‘ecology’ in relation to the infosphere). Of course I
do not have the space to do anything like that in this paper;
I limit myself to making some suggestions of what an
ecological social philosophy would look like. This explo-
ration is important since within the limited space of this
paper I wish to give more substance to the idea of a social-
relational approach to moral consideration: if it is not built
on an individual-ontological foundation but on a social-
relational ontology, then what is this relational ontology?
The concept of ‘relations’ is vague and allows for much
variety in the way it informs the construction of an ontol-
ogy. On the one hand, the emphasis can be put on the
relata, here the entities. For example, Platonic and Aris-
totelian views of the human are only relational in a weak
sense given their essentialism, which amounts to the
assumption that there are intrinsic, alienable features of the
entity. On the other hand, the emphasis can be put on the
relations. However, what does this amount to? Does it
imply collectivism? Eastern worldviews, though originally
very relational, have in practice fused with modern
nationalism in a way that has changed their relational
character: they put so much emphasis on the collectivity
that its ontology looks more like a collectivist version of
ontological essentialism: not the individual but the col-
lectivity has intrinsic features and both the relations and
their (human and non-human) relata tend to become less
important. The nation has essential features and below are
only organs, cells, and smaller units. However, does
emphasis on relations imply that the relata are less
important (morally and ontologically) or even do not exist?
Ecological thinking (deep ecology and ecology as sci-
ence) does seem to put emphasis on relations. In doing so it
is fundamentally different from individualist, essentialist,
collectivist, and totalitarian thinking. But what is the status
of the relata? One answer is: they do not exist. To explore
this direction of thought, we must radicalize existing con-
cepts of natural ecology. Often it still uses early-modern
organicist notions: ecology (as a branch of evolutionary
biology and natural science) talks about dependencies
between ‘organs’ or between ‘organisms’ and their envi-
ronment. And some deep ecologists see ‘the earth’ as an
organism (a misleading term by which they mean all life on
earth or the ecosystem). However, if everything is truly
related and interdependent, why make such a strict dis-
tinction between the border of ‘organisms’ or ‘organs’? A
radically relational ecology would not accept such an
ontology. There are relations between relata, but these re-
lata have no fixed ontological reality. They might appear to
us as wholes; however, this might be only appearance. But
that does not matter; we can work and live with appear-
ances. A different answer is that the relata exist, although
15 See for example Clark 1997 for a Marxist view and Midgley 1984
for the notion of a ‘mixed community’.
16 In information ethics it has been recognized that these cultural
differences are relevant for our moral thinking. Consider for instance
the 2005 special issue on ‘Privacy and Data Privacy Protection in
Asia’ in this journal (Ess 2005). Note also that it is not obvious that
these cultures are entirely non-individualistic. One may argue, for
instance, that in Japanese Shintoism ‘individual’ objects—natural and
artificial—are seen as having spirits. However, this is a very different
kind of ‘individualism’ than Western anthropocentric individualism.
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we cannot give an essentialist definition of them but only a
naturalist explanation, using evolutionary theory for
example. However, this by itself does not solve the ques-
tion about the ontological status of that-which-evolves.
Developing a more comprehensive social ecology will
have to answer these questions. For the purpose of this
paper, let me given a brief definition and description of the
social ecology I have in mind, one which could serve as a
basis for giving moral consideration to some robots.
A social ecology is about relations between various
entities, human and non-human, which are inter-dependent
and adapt to one another. These relations are morally sig-
nificant and moral consideration cannot be conceived apart
from these relations. Again, there is a question about the
status of the relata. The social relata are individuals,
groups, societies, communities, cultures, and indeed some
robots provided that they participate in the social life. What
is their status? We talk about them in the relata in an
individualist and essentialist way since this is how they
appear to us. However, the social and natural sciences
show us how entities are inter-related and suggest a less
individualist and non-essentialist view of the world. We
may need our appearances in order to live and in order to
live together. But appearances can change; we can change
them as much as they change us. And in the end we do not
know if these entities are real and if their boundary is fixed.
This view is distinct from Buddhist ontology, which
assumes that we can answer questions like these, that we
can know the ultimate truth about what is and can clearly
distinguish between reality and appearance.17 It is also
distinct from ancient Greek essentialism and its contem-
porary heir: the scientific quest for ‘elementary particles’
which are supposed to be the most elementary relata.
This (social) ontology needs more work. At this point I
can only say that making a relational argument cannot
avoid such discussions. Arguments for moral consideration
always make a jump from ‘is’ to ‘ought’, not in the sense
that they mistake the normative for the descriptive, but in
the sense that they rest on a view of the world, including
the social world. Both relational and non-relational views
of moral consideration need to make explicit their
ontologies.
What follows from a social-relational ontology for
moral consideration of non-human entities? Within rela-
tional views, there are no longer a priori and ontological
hierarchies between entities like the ancient Aristotelian or
modern neo-Aristotelian ones we are used to. This does not
imply that we can no longer make moral distinctions;
rather, it is not a priori decided what (apparent) moral
status we give to entities on the basis of a hierarchical and
essentialist ontology. Reasoning about moral consideration
of other entities, then, can only be done within a relational
context, one which we experience in practice or in imagi-
nation and which is always open to change. However, what
can be said in addition to this? What does the social-rela-
tional approach articulated above mean for the discussion
about moral consideration of intelligent robots?
Implications for robots, animals, and humans
Let me list some of the implications:
First, in this approach to moral consideration it no
longer makes sense to talk about moral consideration of
robots in general, for example robot rights. Such a manner
of speaking about robots is not only misleading since it
puts all robots into one category but also since it suggests
that moral consideration is entirely non-relational. Instead,
this approach acknowledges that moral consideration is
bound up with social relations between humans and robots.
Therefore, it can pay attention to similarities and differ-
ences between treatments of robots.
Second, whether or not one day we will have conscious
and sentient robots, there will be a long stage in the
development of robots during which artificially intelligent
robots do not meet ‘high’ or ‘hard’ criteria of standard
approaches to moral consideration. This situation leaves us
with two options: either we deny any moral consideration
to such robots or we grant them some moral consider-
ation—that is, a different degree of moral consideration—
on a different basis. Within the standard approach, the
latter option may imply defining less demanding criteria,
such as those proposed by Floridi and Sanders (2004).
However, as a non-relational approach it does not suffi-
ciently take into account the new social functions of
intelligent robots: they appear to us as social entities, not
only as machines or systems with certain features. The
alternative approach proposed in this paper claims to do
that by proposing a relational account of moral consider-
ation based on a social ecology that includes humans and
robots. Floridi (2008) also supports an ecological approach.
However, that is an informational ecology: it is about
relations between information (and ‘inforgs’ as carriers or
instantiations of information). Such an approach is similar
to the ‘elementary’ and essentialist approach of modern
physics and ancient Greek metaphysics: it tries to find an
elementary reality ‘behind’ the appearances. My approach
retains the common sense idea that the world consists of a
wide variety of entities—and, of course, relations between
these entities—without reducing these entities to informa-
tion. The implication is that attention can be paid to social
relations between humans and robots and to the social
17 Although there are differences between Buddhist teachings on
reality, they all seem to assume that we can know that perceived
reality is an illusion or that we perceive ourselves as separate from the
rest of the world while actually we are part of it.
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structures within which these relations are shaped. This
supports reflection on what (degree of) moral consideration
we wish to give to those robots. On this basis, we can arrive
at a range of forms of moral consideration that will be less
strong than robot rights but still imply some obligations
towards robots in the context of particular human-robot
relations. It is not possible to say what these obligations are
a priori, that is, apart from and abstracted from those
relations and contexts. This does not mean that one can no
longer generalize and compare between different kinds of
relations and contexts. Rather, it implies that it is an illu-
sion to think that we can have a moral theory divorced from
the social world in which that theory makes sense and in
which it is practiced and lived.
Of course, to talk of ‘obligations’ we put the emphasis on
the giver of moral consideration. This will probably remain
so as long as we feel that social robots must be given some
moral consideration but not the same degree as humans, who
can literally claim their rights in social contexts. However,
such intuitions can and will change when some robots will
appear differently to us. If that happens and one then wishes
to put the emphasis on the receiver of moral consideration,
one could use the language of rights but widen the moral
vocabulary. For instance, one could talk about ‘soft rights’:
rights given to some robots on account of their participation
in the social life. These rights would not be as ‘hard’ as for
example human rights given the lower degree of moral
consideration18 and given their social-relational basis.
However, to use the terms ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ would suggest
that the standard approach to moral status is the best one and/
or provides epistemic certainty, two assumptions which I
have questioned in this paper. So we might want to create an
altogether different vocabulary.
Third, this approach can also be applied to animals and vice
versa. We can learn from analogies. First, we might apply the
‘hard’ rights/’soft’ rights vocabulary. We could grant ‘soft’
rights to some animals that participate in the social life.
However, if we take this justification seriously we can also try
to go beyond the language of rights altogether and adopt an
approach that is more radically social-relational. Consider
meat production in industrial societies. Instead of asking first
what kind of animal a pig is, we must study and evaluate
relations between humans and pigs within meat production
systems and within industrial society and compare this with
other human-animal relations such as human-pet relations.
This allows us to understand and question our ideas about
moral consideration of animals. Similarly, we must study and
evaluate moral consideration of social robots as different from
consideration of industrial robots not on account of their
intelligence or other features (what kind of robot it is), but on
account of the human-robot and other relations within a larger
social ecology. In this way we can critically reflect on our
current views of moral consideration.
Fourth, this approach can also be applied to moral
consideration of humans. Consider the concept of human
rights. Of course there have been well-known moderately
relational objections to, for instance, human rights, such as
the feminist or Marxist critique.19 In practice, a focus on
rights sometimes obscures structural (power) issues (rela-
ted economic and gender differences) and other reasons
why in spite of agreement on the moral-legal concept of
human rights there is still much human suffering due to
injustice. One could also make a utilitarian argument for
alleviating human suffering that is not based on the idea of
human rights. One might also employ the capability
approach to clarify why human rights do not necessarily
empower people to live their lives in dignity.20 However,
existing (Western) criticisms share a justificatory basis in
ontological features of humans. Marxists, utilitarians, and
neo-Aristotelians have views of ‘human nature’ that are not
relational or not radically relational. They still assume a
human essence that stands apart from the non-human
world. As said before, for a more radically relational view
one has to learn from natural ecology or perhaps non-
Western worldviews if it were possible to purify them from
modern-nationalist influences (e.g. ancient East Asian
philosophies). These views resist and sometimes do not
even understand the concept of human rights since it is so
much linked up with dominant individualist and/or essen-
tialist, non-relational Western worldviews.21 Thus, if we
want to rethink moral consideration of humans and related
moral and political concepts such as human rights, we need
to engage with different kinds of social ontologies and
18 Note that my suggestion that some robots would be given a lower
degree of moral consideration than humans would be challenged by
‘singularitarians’ like Kurzweil (2005), who argue that technology
will accelerate in such a way that robots and other artificial agents
will outstrip us in capacities—which, I presume, would justify a
higher degree of moral consideration according to the standard
approach to moral status.
19 Marx already criticized human rights for assuming egoistic,
inward-looking individuals separated from others. Rather than
universal rights, they are the rights of the bourgeois who want to
protect their private property. Feminists add that they are the rights of
male bourgeois.
20 See for example Nussbaum (2000, 2006). The idea is that ascribing
human rights or dignity to people remains abstract and perhaps even
meaningless unless those rights and that dignity are interpreted as
requiring that we improve what people are actually capable of doing.
In Nussbaum’s sufficitarian view of justice, this means that we should
not permit that capabilities of human beings fall below a minimum
threshold.
21 Of course our societies are not internally homogenous (they are
always hybrids), there are differences between these societies, and
‘the West’ does not have a clear border or definition. But one cannot
deny that there are general tendencies in the way most people in
Europe and the US see the world and that in other parts of the world
there are other tendencies.
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make explicit our position. We cannot ‘do ethics’ without
occupying ourselves with these wider philosophical issues
and practical problems.
Finally, note that those who are unwilling to depart from
the familiar, non-relational approach to moral consideration
could of course try to combine the two approaches. For
instance, Warren (1997) has developed a multi-criteria view
of moral status: moral status depends on relational and non-
relational properties. However, apart from the fact that her
account applies only to living things—a limitation that can
be overcome—her account of relational criteria is not sys-
tematic. It calls for attention to social relations (which it
shares with ethics of care and feminist ethics), but unlike the
framework sketched here, it stops there and suggests that its
turn to relations has no fundamental consequences for the
non-relational account. Warren’s account does too little to
avoid the impression that we can have relational and non-
relational criteria side by side without further problems, that
we can simply add relational criteria. However, the issue of
moral consideration cannot be dealt with by accumulating
criteria: multiple criteria as such are acceptable, but there are
strong tensions between a more relational approach and a
more individual-ontological approach. A combination or
‘synthesis’ seems difficult since both approaches are con-
nected to different views about the social. Instead Warren’s
view seems to suggest that we can (and should) avoid
choosing one of these moral-social directions, that we can
have it all. It asks us to use multiple criteria in order to
‘represent all the relevant considerations’ (Warren 1997, p.
177) but fails to pay sufficient attention to tensions between
the ‘criteria’ in terms of their social ontologies. Moreover,
her use of the language of ‘properties’ (of the entity), which is
common to most existing approaches, tends to deny the
nature and potential of the ‘paradigm shift’ offered by a
relational approach. Can we speak of ‘properties’ at all once
we adopt a relational approach? On the one hand, it seems to
me that within a radically relational ontology, relational
properties do not exist since one can no longer make sense of
the idea of a ‘property’, something that belongs to an entity.
One is not conscious in the way one owns a house or a car.
What appears to belong to an entity is always open to change
and makes only sense in relation to that entity. On the other
hand, given the importance of appearance, one could still
speak of properties as long as it is understood that we mean
properties-as-they-appear-to-us within a social-relational,
social-ecological context.
Conclusion
Whether or not it is acceptable to grant rights to some
robots, reflection on the development of artificially intel-
ligent robots reveals significant problems with our existing
justifications of moral consideration. This forces both
defenders and opponents of robot rights to reconsider their
conceptual frameworks. In this paper I have offered an
alternative, social-relational approach to moral consider-
ation, which reframes the issue of moral consideration by
shifting the focus from rights and properties to relations.
This approach invites us to explore radically relational,
ecological ontologies. It has implications beyond theory of
moral consideration and applies to artificial as well bio-
logical entities.
Let me unpack this conclusion in order to further clarify
this paper’s contribution to discussions about robot rights
and moral consideration. Most current and, as we can
expect, near-future robots will not meet the ‘hard’ or ‘high’
criteria set by the deontological, rights approach or the
utilitarian approach. However, this paper shows that there
are enough other conceptual resources available to grant
some kind and some degree of moral consideration to
robots. My reflection on these alternative resources
involved an analysis of the standard direct and indirect
arguments for moral consideration. This analysis revealed
those arguments as based on ontological features of the
entity in question, which incurs particular (and often well-
known) problems. In response to these problems I offered a
first sketch of a novel argument for moral consideration
based on social relations.
This approach might be used by both defenders and
opponents of robot rights, provided that they justify their
views by relying on social-relational arguments. However, if
they really digest the relational approach, they will feel
invited to reframe the issue as a question about how to shape
our relations to robots instead of a question about moral
status, properties, or rights. Rights appear as meta-proper-
ties: moral properties based on properties such as con-
sciousness or sentience. By contrast, the relational approach
suggests that we should not assume that there is a kind of
moral backpack attached to the entity in question; instead,
moral consideration is granted within a dynamic relation
between humans and the entity under consideration.
Moreover, I have shown that such an approach to moral
consideration does not stand on its own but implies that we
should also revise our ontological and social-political
frameworks. Liberal-individualist, collectivist, and com-
munitarian conceptions of the social are challenged by the
idea of a (radically) relational ontology, which draws our
moral attention to relations—with other humans as well as
with non-human entities. I have suggested that we may
want to turn to social ecology to develop this approach and
have made brief comparisons with existing Western and
Eastern political theory in order to make explicit what I
have in mind.
Of course this ‘relational turn’ raises many issues—
more questions remain than I can answer here. In
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particular, while as I have argued a simple addition of
relational and non-relational criteria should be avoided, it
is still not entirely clear if a turn to (social) relations
demands a ‘paradigm shift’ that completely abandons
existing ethical and social theories or if it requires a more
moderate revision of these theories. For example, is this
approach (in)compatible with a virtue ethics and commu-
nitarian framework? Do we need to accept a radically
relational ontology and what does that mean exactly? What
are the implications of the approach for well-known ethical
and political concepts? I have briefly explored the issue of
(human) rights but what are the implications for other
concepts such as justice and equality22? What exactly can
we learn from natural ecology and from East Asian phi-
losophy? Much more work has to be done to develop this
argument and this incomplete account, to further compare
it with other relational and with non-relational accounts
(e.g. to further specify its relation to phenomenology and
feminism), to spell out and elaborate its ontological and
social-philosophical assumptions and implications, and to
apply it to robots and other entities, including humans.
However, here is a rough outline of an alternative approach
to moral consideration that may assist us in shaping our
relations to intelligent robots and, by extension, to all
artificial and biological entities that appear to us as more
than instruments for our human purposes.
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